We take for granted that the embodiment of value is defined, fixed, and usually stable. Yet this fixity has a longer history. Expansion and consolidation of state power in the United States, France, or Great Britain are distant enough, and economies sufficiently stable (parts of the 1970s aside), that we assume dollars, pounds, and some European currency (once francs and deutschmarks, the euro at the moment) are natural, operative means for storing value and facilitating exchange. While the relative value of currencies can change due to international currency markets, central bank policies, and inflationary forces, currency itself is seldom questioned. This is true not only for the average American or Briton; it is also true for academics, especially economists and political scientists. The discourse of post-socialist reform was dominated essentially by two issues: privatization and stabilizing currencies. Reining in inflation was key to IMF-sponsored reforms in Latin America and the post-socialist world; the ruble, zloty, and others were foci for policy. "Currency" was reified as objective, real, and following its own economic laws. Yet the empirical reality of currencies is subjective and less straightforward. Economists certainly do not suggest money descends from Heaven as an objective measure of value; maintaining market faith in a currency is an important task for economists and government advisors alike. However, money remains central in economic analyses, either as part of the driving question (e.g. reducing inflation) or as an assumed component to that central issue (e.g. tax collection or wages). Money has become so central to modern life that we do not question its ubiquity. However, this issue should be problematized, especially for Russian post-socialism. What exactly was "money" after the fall of the command economy and the USSR? The ruble remained the official means of exchange; but legal formality is never the entire 135 J. Hass, Rethinking the Post-Soviet Experience
picture. As Sánchez-Andrés and March-Poquet (2002) note, the ruble may have been legal currency, but it was not institutionalized as an all-encompassing store of value and means of exchange: through the 1990s workers and others remained embedded in paternalist relations of reciprocity that reduced the power of money as a universal mode of valuation and remuneration. For that reason, as they argue, barter was not simply a response to scarcity of capital; it was a fundamental and competing mode of exchange.
Pecunia non olet (money does not smell). In mainstream economics, money is money regardless of its source and use: it is fungible. Yet the social reality is that money has various odors. A single currency can have multiple and even incompatible meanings and functions, and several forms of "money" might be used as means of exchange and store of value. Sociologist Viviana Zelizer (1997), foremost in studying meanings assigned to money, suggests there are "multiple monies" even for a single currency. A wage, blood money, and pin money are not treated the same, even though they are the same currency and have the same value. Wages are to be spent; pin money to be saved for a special occasion such as a holiday; and blood money, earned in tragedy (e.g. an insurance payment for the accidental death of a spouse or sibling), is spent only on sacred or important items, such as children's education. In Great Britain circa 2000 one popular argument against adopting the euro was losing the pound as a symbol central to national identity. In short, while economists consider money to be fungible-money is money and is freely interchangeable between different functions-the reality of money, and of currency and value, is a more complicated story, especially in post-Soviet Russia. Cultural contradictions of the meaning of "money" and the means of embodying value came to the surface as state power and economic institutions weakened. Multiple monies emerged as a result. Moral and market economies appeared in different dynamics from what we have seen so far, and in fact reversed: a market economy providing the means for resistance to the project of imposing a single currency (the ruble), with the ruble a symbolic expression of state power and the sovereignty of a national identity. To stabilize exchange, businessmen and entrepreneurs used barter (currency in kind), hard currency (valiuta), and other forms of "money." The impetus for a unified currency, the ruble, came from the state. This seems to be the usual story-states enforce a single currency on their territory to make exchange and investment effective and efficient 1 and to facilitate extraction of resources through taxes-but there is more than this.
Amidst the myriad insights from a host of scholarship on the financial dimension of post-socialism are two oversights. First, usual accounts
